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THE FCC'S RESTRICTIONS ON 
EMPLOYEES' PUBLICATIONS: A 
FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION? 
MICHAEL BOTEIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Communications Act of 1934 provides that the Federal 
Communications Commission may not censor its licensees,1 and 
the Commission often has repeated its hesitancy to pass judg-
ment on program content.2 Courts and commentators also have 
addressed themselves frequently to fIrst amendment limitations 
on the Commission's powers? Ironically enough, however, 
there is little concern with the Commission's internal censor-
ship-its restrictions on its own employees' rights to publish. 
The hard truth of the matter is simply that the Commission 
exercises total censorship over its employees' publications. The 
Commission thus prevents its employees from publishing schol-
arly-as opposed to sensational-articles in professional journals. 
Section 19.735-203(c) of the Commission's Rules4 requires on 
* B.A., Wesleyan University, 1966; J.D., Cornell University, 1969; 
LL.M., Columbia University, 1972. Mr. Botein is a former senior attorney 
advisor, Cable Television Bureau, Federal Communications Commission. 
147 U.S.C. § 326 (1972) provides that: 
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the 
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or 
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition 
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere 
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication. 
2See, e.g., Hon. Harley O. Staggers, 30 FCC 2d 150 (1971), in which 
the Commission refused to review the accuracy of the controversial 
"Selling of the Pentagon" program. 
3See, e.g., Jaffe, Program Control, 14 Vill. L. Rev. 619 (1969); Note, 
Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 701 (1964); 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
447 C.F.R. § 19.735-203(c) (1974) provides that: 
Employees of the Commission are encouraged to engage in teaching, 
231 
232 / FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS BAR JOURNAL 
its face only that "articles written by the staff shall not identify 
the author with the Commission or the federal government 
unless prior approval has been obtained" from the Executive 
Director, the Chairman, or an individual Commissioner, de-
pending upon the status of the employee. In theory, the rule 
thus appears to require clearance only if a Commission em-
ployee wishes to have an article reflect his status at the Conunis-
sion. In practice, however, the Commission has given the rule a 
radically different interpretation. The Commission interprets 
the rule as requiring clearance of any publication which either 
identifies the author with the Commission or deals with com-
munications law. Moreover, an employee's chance of securing 
clearance is virtually nil. In addition to denying. permission 
outright, the Commission often delays a decision indefinitely-
lecturing, and writing that is not prohibited by law, the Executive Order, 
the Civil Service Regulations, or this chapter. However, an employee of the 
Commission shall not, either with or without compensation engage in 
teaching, lecturing, or writing, including teaching, lecturing, or writing for 
the purpose of the special preparation of a person or class of persons for 
an examination of the Civil Service Commission or Board of Examiners for 
the Foreign Service, that is dependent on information obtained as a result 
of his Government employment, except when that information has been 
made available to the general public or will be made available on request, 
or when the Chairman gives written authorization for the use of nonpublic 
information on the basis that the use is in the public interest. Articles 
written by the staff shall not identify the author with the Commission or 
the Federal government unless prior approval has been obtained: In the 
case of employees generally, from the Executive Director upon the 
recommendation of the appropriate Bureau Chief; in the case of Heads of 
Offices and Bureaus, from the Chairman; and in the case of an employee in 
the immediate office of a Commissioner, from the individual Commis-
sioner. Nor shall documents prepared in the course of official duties be 
used for private gain by any Commission employee. In addition, the 
Commissioners shall not receive compensation or anything of monetary 
value for any consultation, lecture, discussion, writing, or appearance the 
subject matter of which is devoted substantially to the responsibilities, 
programs, or operations of the Commission, or which draws substantially 
on official data or ideas which have not become part of the body of public 
information. 
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thus killing the relevance of any publication which deals with an 
even vaguely topical subject. 
It is difficult to estimate the subjects on which Commission 
employees might be interested in publishing, for the simple 
reason that employees never have been free to publish. Legal 
personnel, however, presumably might wish to write about the 
Commission's powers and responsibilities under the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, the Administrative Procedure Act, and 
various judicial doctrines. Similarly, engineers or economists 
might be interested in contributing to the numerous trade 
journals in their fields; indeed, a short mathematical equation or 
general theory often must hit print immediately, in order to be 
of any value to the public. In any event, it probably is safe to 
say that a Commission employee would have little interest in a 
shocking revelation or an expose. 
A Commission employee dare not treat the rule lightly, 
since a violation quite literally puts his or her job on the line. 
Other portions of the Commission's Rules provide that an 
employee's violation Of any internal Commission rule may lead 
to reprimand, suspension, or removal.5 Accordingly, the mere 
existence of the rule has a chilling effect on any employee's 
desire to publish. 
This combination of the rule's interpretation and the Com-
mission's refusal to grant permission is simply that Commission 
employees are barred from publishing on the subjects about 
which they know the most. An employee presumably derives 
little consolation from the fact that he or she is perfectly free to 
547 C.F.R. § 19.735-l07(a)(c)(v) (1974). Indeed, there may be some 
question as to whether removal of an employee for violating the rule is 
even within the Commission's statutory powers. The general provision 
governing discharge of federal employees, 5 U.S.C. § 750l(a) (1972) 
requires a rmding of "cause," and publication of nonconfidential 
information might very well be held not to constitute such. As noted later, 
at 244 infra, the Supreme Court recently has supplied this statute with a 
more definite gloss. Arnett v. Kennedy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4513, 4520-21 (April 
16,1974). 
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write about the Rule in Shelley's Case or the holder in due 
course doctrine. 
The Commission's interpretation and enforcement of the 
rule thus constitute bad and basically unreasoned policy; as will 
be noted,6 there appears to be little justification for the Com-
mission's position. In addition, the COmmlssion's application of 
the rule represents a very tangible inhibition on the first amend-
ment rights of Commission employees. The rule thus is prob-
ably unconstitutional as well as unwise. Accordingly, the Com-
mission should repeal the portion of the rule which requires 
prior clearance of articles. 
LACK OF JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RULE 
Attempting to discern the goal of the anti-publication rule 
is somewhat arduous, for the simple reason that the Commis-
sion never has bothered to defme or explain the rule publicly. 
Accordingly, the only alternative is to make some hopefully 
educated guesses as to the possible justifications for the rule. 
There are five possible goals, none of which seems to justify the 
rule. 
First, the Commission might be concerned with preventing 
the disclosure of confidential or classified information. But 
while this may be a constitutionally valid goal,7 the anti-publi-
cation rule is a highly questionable means of reaching it. Confi-
dential information leaks out of the Commission in a steady 
stream, as perusal of any trade magazine indicates.8 In addition, 
federal statutes make the release of confidential information 
not only a federal crime, but also grounds for dismissal.9 
Accordingly, the Commission has little need to prevent the 
publication of potentially confidential material, since it can 
take either disciplinary or criminal action after the fact. 
6 See pp. 234-237 infra. 
7 See pp. 244-245 infra. 
8 Ironically enough, many Commission employees discover the contents 
of closed agenda meetings from trade magazines. 
918 U.S.C. § § 789,1905 (1972); 50 U.S.C. § 783 (1972). 
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A second possible justification for the rule might be to 
prevent the public from confusing private staff opinions with 
public Commission policies. This rationale seems somewhat 
questionable, however, in light of the fact that Commission 
employees are perfectly free to-and often do-giYe advisory 
opinions to the public.! 0 Since Commission employees' per-
sonal opinions are in continuous circulation, it actually would 
be preferable for employees to reduce them to print-a medium 
which is available to all and which can be challenged readily. 
Moreover, Commissioners may publish to their hearts' con-
tent;!! many have done so. A Commissioner's statement pre-
sumably carries much more weight with the public than an 
employee's, even though one Commissioner cannot bind the 
agency. Accordingly, it is somewhat anomalous to invoke the 
rule against Commission employees, but not against Commis-
sioners. 
Third, the rule might be designed to prevent the Commis-
sion from embarassment through publication of nonconfidential 
but unfavorable information-such as that uncovered by various 
! 0 A somewhat bizarre variation on this theme occurs when an 
organization makes a transcript of an employee's speech and then publishes 
it without his consent. In this case, the employee clearly is identified with 
the Commission and comments on matters before the Commission; 
nevertheless, the Commission obviously is powerless to enforce its internal 
personnel regulations against a third party. Even more convoluted conduct 
occurs if the publishing organization is conscientious enough to ask the 
employee's permission to publish his or her remarks; in that situation, the 
employee presumably must make a request for permission from the 
Commission, even though the employee did not initiate the publication. 
!! The rule does not run against Commissioners for the simple reason 
that they are not employees of the Commission, but rather are 
accountable only to the executive and legislative branches. Congress could 
impose a similar anti-publication requirement upon Commissioners if it 
chose to, however, and its failure even to consider the issue indicates that 
it does not find that publication by Commissioners constitutes a threat to 
any national interest. Administrative law judges also are exempt from the 
rule. since the Administrative Procedure Act prevents an agency from 
exerting any control over their activities. 5 U.S.C. § 5335(a) (1972). 
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"Nader's Raiders" groups. 1 2 As noted before, however, the 
internal workings of the Commission are commonly known to 
at least the communications bar; accordingly, it does little real 
good to prevent an employee from publishing that a particular 
Commissioner seems to have a particular constituency. More 
importantly, Commission employees embarrass the Commission 
more severely by conduct than by publication; an inept hand-
ling of a regulatory issue or a public exhibition of drunkenness 
certainly hurts the Commission far more than an article criti-
cizing the Commission's regulatory policies. This type of con-
duct, however, obviously is not subject to prior clearance. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, prevention of embarass-
ment is a rather tenuous interest at best; as will be noted laterl 3 
the courts have accorded it virtually no weight. 
A fourth basis for the rule might be to prevent criticism of 
the Commission by its own employees. This justification is 
somewhat questionable at best, however, for several reasons. 
The Commission already is on the receiving end of brickbats of 
every size, shape, and variety. Courts, congressional committ.ees, 
and s;ommentators generally comment about the Commission in 
highly critical terms. 1 4 Accordingly, potentially increased criti-
cism by Commission employees would be comparatively small. 
And ironically enough, the antipublication rule prevents Com-
mission personnel from replying to criticism of the Commission. 
For example, a recent article by former Commissioner Nicholas 
Johnson15 levied scores of criticisms against the Commission, 
which many employees thought were unfounded. The anti-pub-
lication rule prevented an employee from responding to John-
12 For an example of this type of revelation, see R. Fellmeth, The 
Interstate Commerce Omission (1970). 
13 See pp. 242. infra. 
14 See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. 
FCC, 359 F. 2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); B. Schwartz, The Professor and the 
Commissions (1959). . 
15 Johnson & Dystal, A Day in the Life: The Federal Communications 
Commission, 82 Yale L.J. 1575 (1973). 
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son, however, and thus deprived the Commission of a poten-
tially spirited and effective defense. Finally, immunity from 
criticism has no higher social value than prevention of embarass-
ment. 
The fifth and fmal possible justification for the rule might 
be to prevent Commission employees from abusing their status 
at the Commission to get their writings published. This rationale 
proceeds from the assumption that editors will accord deference 
to Commission employees, on the theory that their writings are 
particularly interesting, accurate, or meritorious. This possi-
bility seems, however, comparatively remote. Most editors are 
not likely to be cowed by the fact that a writer works for the 
Commission, since legal publishers deal with high-powered law-
yers on a daily basis. Moreover, it is somewhat unrealistic to 
assume that an author's position is never relevant to his or her 
ability to get published. It is a common-albeit perhaps unjust-
fact of life that a Harvard University law professor generally 
receives more invitations to publish than a Podunk University 
law professor. 
Accordingly, none of the possible justifications for the 
anti-publication rule appears to hold much water. Conversely, 
however, allowing Commission employees to publish freely may 
have a number of positive effects. 
First, many Commission employees have good ideas about 
regulatory policy, but simply lack a forum in which to express 
them. As in any other bureaucracy, the Commission's hier-
archial structure carefully filters the information which high-
level personnel receive.! 6 Accordingly, a Commission employee 
often lacks any real forum in' which to present potentially 
useful ideas. Removing the constraints on publication thus 
would allow employees to present their ideas both within and 
without the Commission. 
!6For an excellent general discussion of the,means by which an agency 
controls the internal flow of information, see A. Downs, Inside 
Bureaucracy (I966). 
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Second, Commission employees often know more about a 
particular area of Commission policy than practitioners or 
commentators. Unlike "general" communications practitioners, 
Commission employees usually specialize in a comparatively 
narrow area at any given time. For example, most members vf 
the communications bar deal with a mix of broadcasting, safety 
and special services, and cable television; a Commission em-
ployee is unlikely, however, to work in more than one of these 
areas at the same time. Accordingly, a Commission employee 
brings to his or her writing a greater understanding. 
Third, Commission employees have far less of an economic 
dis-incentive against publishing than practitioners. Since Com-
mission employees are not remunerated on a per-hour basis, 
they can afford more easily to devote their leisure time to 
writing. Accordingly, abolition of the anti-publication rule 
would increase significantly the amount of writing-and thus 
hopefully the amount of discussion-on issues of concern to the 
Commission. 
Finally, the rule's muzzling effect makes many Commission 
employees feel like second-class citizens, in relation to their 
brethren at the private bar. Allowing Commission employees to 
publish thus not only would increase their morale, but also 
would place them in a better position vis-a-vis the private bar. 
Accordingly, abolition of the anti-publication rule would 
have a number of highly desirable results. It would add signifi-
cant and knowledgeable content to discussions of regulatory 
policy. Moreover, abolition of the rule would redound ulti-
mately to the Commission's benefit, by improving the morale of 
its employees. 
To be sure, total freedom to publish carries with it the 
potential risk of releasing confidential or classified information. 
As noted before, however,! 7 the Commission already has per-
fectly adequate disciplinary and criminal remedies for such 
situations. Indeed, if a Commission employee is intelligent 
17 Supra at 234. 
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enough to write a publishable article, it seems unlikely that he 
or she would be stupid enough to use confidential or classified 
informa tion. 
The practices of other federal agencies merely reinforce 
this conclusion. Some agencies simply appear to have no restric-
tions at all, while others have very limited bans. Indeed, a 
number of agencies have rules which use the same language as 
the first two sentences in the Commission's rule, but which 
omit any ban on publication or any requirement of clearance.1 8 
Since other agencies have made the considered judgment that 
they can do business on this basis, there seems to be little basis 
in fact for believing that the Commission can not. 
The Commission's anti-publication rule thus represents an 
unwise-albeit largely inadvertent-policy choice. Moreover, and 
perhaps more important, it is a substantial inhibition on Com-
mission employees' rust amendment rights 
VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
, 
Government employees today can blame much of the 
courts' initial hesitancy to recognize their rust amendment 
rights on Mr. Justice Holmes. While still sitting on the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Holmes handed down one of 
his equisitely drafted opinions, holding that a city could dis-
charge an employee who spoke on political issues. In the course 
of his opinion, Holmes gratuitously made an observation which 
remained viable until all too recently: 
The plaintiff may have a constitutional right to talk polities, but he 
has no constitutional right to be a policeman.1 9 
18See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 0.735-40(d) (1971) (Atomic Energy 
Commission); 18 C.F.R. § 3.735-5(2) (1974) (Federal Power Com-
mission); 29 C.F.R. § 1600.735-203(b) (1974) (Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission). 
19McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). 
John J. McAuliffe was an ordinary policeman who violated a department 
rule by helping his party to bring the vote in. The whole lawsuit appears to 
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Until the second half of the twentieth century, the rule in 
McAuliffe's case was alive and well. To be sure, the Supreme 
Court had held as early as 1926 that the government could not 
exact unconstitutional conditions-the famous "rock and whirl-
pool" imagery of Mr. Justice Sutherland.2 ° Nevertheless, it 
did not quickly apply this reasoning to public employees' fIrst 
amendment rights; indeed, for a,long time th€' Court's test of an 
unconstitutional condition was whether the condition was rea-
sonably related to the governmental privilege granted.21 
The tone of this argument was set in United Public Workers 
v. Mitchell, 2 2 where the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the Hatch Act's ban on all political activities by ·federal em-
ployees. Writing for a bare plurality of four, Mr. Justice Reed 
spoke only in terms of the government's need for political 
purity in its workers; he never even raised the issue of an 
employee's interest in maintaining his or her job. In several 
early loyalty cath cases, the Court thus used similar reasoning 
to uphold statutes which conditioned public employment upon 
execution of non-communist oaths and affIdavits.23 At the 
same time, however, the Court began to accept the notion of at 
least some vested interest in public employment. It thus noted 
that: 
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public 
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protec· 
have been basically just a local political squabble between rival factions. 
Unfortunately, however, the report of the case reveals the party affiliation 
of neither McAuliffe nor his superiors. 
20 Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926). The court 
went on to note that "the power of the state is not unlimited; and one of 
the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the 
relinquishment of constitutional rights." ld. at 593-94. 
21 See, e.g., Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional 
Rights, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 321,325 (1935); Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1595, 
1597 (1960). 
22330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
23See, e.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); 
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
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tion does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to 
stlltute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.24 
The Court took a major step toward changing this view of 
government employees in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 25 The 
court there invalidated the same loyalty oath statute which a 
decade before it had upheld.2 6 More importantly, however, the 
Court noted that it had modified its conception of a govern-
ment employee's interest in his or her job. 
The Couit thus recognized that potential deprivation of a 
job was as serious a sanction as a potential civil or criminal 
proceeding. Accordingly, an agency cannot do indirectly by 
dismissal what it cannot do drrectly by prosecution. To be sure, 
different classes of federal employees have different expectan-
cies concerning job security; a quasi-political Schedule C ap-
pointee does not envision tenure and knows that he or she can 
be frred by the agency at will. Nevertheless, dismissal represents 
a very real hardship for any class of employee; indeed, the 
Court has not drawn frrst amendment lines on the basis of an 
employee's status.2 7 
Accordingly, the Court has taken an increasingly dim view 
24Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 185 (1952)., The Court later picked 
up this more or less offhand comment and used it as the basis for 
invalidating a number of other indirect inhibitions on Irrst amendment 
rights. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); (conditioning of 
state tax benefits on non-communist oath); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 
488 (I961) (legislative investigations of alleged communists). 
25 385 U.S. 589 (1966). 
26 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). While the Adler 
case had upheld the statute on its face, the Keyishian Court found that the 
interaction of numerous and complex statutes made the whole scheme 
void for vagueness. If the Court had considered the issue on a totally fresh 
basis, it thus presumably would have held flatly that the statute violated 
the First Amendment. 
27 And even more recently, the Court has applied rigorous procedural 
due process requirements to the dismissal of even non-tenured personnel. 
Compare Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) with Board of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
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of any inhibitions on the fIrst amendment rights of government 
employees. The Commission's anti-publication rule thus runs 
afoul of the First Amendment for a number of reasons-its 
chilling effect on employees' speech, its operation as a prior 
restraint, and its discriminatory application. 
Chilling Effect 
The Supreme Court laid McAuliffe to a long overdue and 
well deserved rest in Pickering v. Board of Education2 8. The 
Court there held that a school board could not fIre a teacher 
because he had criticized the school's management in a letter to 
a local newspaper. Indeed, Pickering represented a far more 
aggravated situation than that at which the Commission's anti-
PQblication rule is aimed; the Court there found that several of 
the statements in the teacher's letter were defamatory.2 9 
Although the Court held that it would not be "feasible to 
attempt to lay down a general standard ... ," 3 ° it made quite 
clear that it viewed any muzzling of government employees 
with extreme suspicion. It thus rejected out of hand the school 
board's argument that it had some vague interest in restricting 
its employees' public statements. A governmental entity, the 
Court stated, had no particular immunity from criticism.3 1 
Indeed, the Court noted that the operation of public schools 
was a matter of "legitimate public concern"32 and that govern-
ment employees often were the best critics of government: 
Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to 
have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the 
operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential 
28 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
291d. at 572-73. Moreover, the plaintiffs letter in Pickering was highly 
critical. It noted that "this shows their stop at 'nothing' attitude ... " and 
pointed up "the kind of totalitarianism teachers live in at the high school, 
and your children go to school." 
30ld. at 569. 
31!d. at 571. 
321d. 
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that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear 
of retaliatory disrnissa1.33 
In fact, the Court indicated that an agency was justified in 
dismissing an employee for a public statement only if it created 
a very serious and tangible discipline problem within the govern-
ment34 -a condition which is likely to be rare.3 5 
Pickering's reasoning should apply with even greater force 
to the Commission's anti-publication rule, which penalizes em-
ployees not for making defamatory public statements, but 
rather for making any public statements at all. The Commission 
certainly can not claim any greater immunity from criticism 
than a school board; indeed, it should be more open to criti-
cism, because of its greater public interest responsibilities. Simi-
larly, Commission actions are matters of "legitimate public 
concern" almost by definition, since the agency is under a 
statutory mandate to enforce the "public interest, convenience, 
any necessity."3 6 And just as teachers are the best critics of 
school boards, Commission employees may be the best critics of 
the Commission-without using any classified or confidential 
information. As noted before,37 Commission employees have 
an almost unique ability to develop expertise in specialized 
areas and to transfer that expertise into useful publications. 
To be sure, the scope and vitality of Pickering may be 
33 ld. at 572. 
341d. at 570. 
35 One lower federal court found that a government employee's public 
statements were sufficiently serious to create a discipline problem. Moore 
v. Board of Education, 452 F. 2d 726 (5thCir.1971). Most other federal 
courts have looked at such governmental claims, however, somewhat 
suspiciously. See, e.g., Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F. 2d 475 (7th Cir. 
1972); Commonwealth ex. reI. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 
356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
36 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1972). Thus a school board arguably might 
concern itself only with a limited constituency-e.g., school-age children-
while the Commission must consider the whole panoply of differing and 
often conflicting public interests. 
37Supra at 238. 
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marginally suspect. In Arnett v. Kennedy, 38 the Court upheld 
the dismissal of an OEO employee who had accused a higher 
official of misusing government funds. But though the result in 
Arnett certainly was diametrically opposed to that in Pickering, 
the reasoning was not. The only fIrst amendment issue before 
the court was the constitutionality of the statute which autho-
rized plaintiffs discharge; and the plurality held only that the 
statute was not void for vagueness. Indeed, the plurality cited 
Pickering only once,39 and did not discuss the case at all. The 
Court's very inability to muster a majority as well as the cloudy 
nature of the plurality opinion thus make the case almost 
useless as precedent. 
Moreover, the Court has gone to great lengths in protecting 
government employees' rights to criticize their subordinates. In 
Barr v. Matteo, 4 0 the Court held that former employees could 
not recover damages in a libel action against their former 
supervisor, who had issued a defamatory press release concern-
ing them. In thus conferring an absolute privilege upon govern-
ment officials, the Court reasoned that employees needed to 
pursue their notions of the public interest freely. The court 
noted that: 
It has been thought important that officials of government should be 
free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage 
suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties-suits which 
wOllld consume time and energies which would otherwise be devoted 
to governmental services and the threat of which might appreciably 
inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies 
of government.41 
To be sure, the Court did not extend the principle to all 
government employees at all levels; indeed, it indicated that the 
privilege might attach only to employees with policy-making 
38 42 U.S.L.W. 4513 (April 16, 1974). The case definitely had some 
strange overtones to it, since the plaintiff's statement was that his 
supervisor had offered $100,000 to a local agency to sign a statement 
accusing the plaintiff of wrong-doing. 
39 ld. at 4522. 
40 360 U.S. 564 (1959). 
41 ld. at 571. 
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functions. At the same time, however, the Court made clear 
that though the scope of the privilege might vary from official 
to official, almost any professional. employee would receiv~ 
some protection.42 Moreover, the Court later extended the 
principle to a Navy captain,43 and the lower federal courts have 
applied the Barr doctrine to comparatively low-level em-
ployees.44 
The converse of the Barr principle is that government 
employees should be free to criticize their employers. Indeed, it 
would be somewhat anomalous to permit agency employees to 
defame their subordinates, and yet not allow a right of reply.4 5 
Moreover, Barr establishes the principle that government em-
ployees should be free to speak out on issues which they 
consider important to the public. 
Finally, at least one court has shown a willingness to curtail 
agency censorship of employees' publications. In United States 
v. Marchetti,46 the Fourth Circuit enjoined a former employee 
of the Central Intelligence Agency from publishing a book 
which discussed his experiences with the CIA, on the ground 
that he had signed a valid agreement to clear all publications 
with the agency. The court was careful to restrict the grounds 
of its decision, however, to situations involving classified infor-
mation and national security. The court thus refused to enforce 
the contract "to the extent that it purports to prevent unclassi-
fied information, for, to that extent, the oath would be in 
contravention of his [the plaintiff's] First Amendment 
rightS.,,47 Moreover, in considering the specific deletions which 
421d. at 573-74. 
43 Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959). 
44For an excellent discussion of these cases, see W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, 
Cases and Materials on Administrative Law 309-314 (5th Ed. 1970). 
45 Indeed, the Commission's own fairness doctrine and regulations 
create a right of reply. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1974). 
46 466 F. 2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 1063 (1973). 
471d. at 1317 (footnote omitted). Ironically enough, the CIA's action 
backfired, by giving the book tremendous free publicity. In its ultimately 
censored form, it sold quite well. This type of backlash thus indicates that 
agencies profit little from playing the role of censor. 
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the CIA had made, the District Court later rejected several 
hundred of them-thus indicating that its view of classified 
information was rather different from the CIA's.411 
The Commission's anti-publication rule thus seems to fly in 
the face of the First Amendment, to the extent that it consti-
tutes a flat ban on publication by employees. The rule repre-
sents a type of thinking which may have had some validity fIfty 
years ago, but which now has lost its vitality. 
Prior Restraint 
Although censorship was a common and accepted practice 
during colonial days, in recent times the Court has condemned 
prior restraints in all but the most compelling situations.49 
Moreover, the Court has been particularly chary about "admin-
istrative restraints"50 and about censors with too much discre-
tion.51 In addition, the Court has recognized that informal 
pressure may constitute a very tangible prior restraint5 2 and 
that threats can be as inhibiting as action.5 3 
The Commission's anti-publication rule thus does not seem 
to fall within the narrow scope of allowable prior restraints. 
Enforcement of the rule obviously involves "administrative 
restraints," since it rests in the hands of administrative offIcials. 
Moreover, calling the rule vague goes far by way of understate-
48 Alfred B. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, (Civ. No. 540-73-A, B.D. Va., 1974). 
And even more recently, the Third Circuit held that a housing authority 
could not discipline employees for taking public positions on a referendum 
which the agency was conducting. Aldermen v. Philadelphia Housing 
Authority,42 U.S.L.W. 2574 (3rd Cir., April 16,.1974). 
49Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The Court indicated that it 
would uphold prior restraints only to prevent publication of obscenity or 
interference with the national security. 
50 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) struck down a 
Rhode Island . statutory scheme whereby state officials would "advise" 
book dealers that sale of a particular book might lead to criminal liability. 
51 In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) the Court 
found that a statutory standard of "sacreligious" was too vague. 
52Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
53Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946). 
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ment; as noted before,s4 on its face the rule prohibits only 
identification of an author as a Commission employee. Finally, 
the rule represents a very tangible threat to every Commission 
employee, since a violation can lead to dismissal. 
Moreover, even if the substance of the rule met the Court's 
increasingly stringent standards, the enforcement procedure 
would not. In the extremely narrow range of permissible prior 
restraints, the Court has conditioned the use of prior restraints 
upon a high degree of procedural due process. In Freedman v. 
Maryland,S 5 the Court thus struck down a Maryland statue 
which provided for prior adminstrative review of motion pic-
tures. Although the Court previously had recognized obscenity 
as one of the few areas in which a prior restraint was appropri-
ate,S 6 it held that the Maryland statutory scheme failed to 
provide adequate procedural due process. The Court thus held 
that any form of prior restraint had to place the burden of 
proof upon the censor and provide for speedy judicial review of 
the censor's decision.s 7 
The Commission's anti-publication rule fails to meet either 
test. Neither the rule nor its interpretation places the burden of 
proof upon the Commission. And the Commission is under no 
duty at all to secure a speedy judicial determination as to the 
validity of its restraint. Indeed, it is somewhat questionable as 
to whether an employee could secure judicial review at all, since 
the Commission's failure to grant permission hardly represents a 
final order-let alone any order at all. 
The anti-publication rule thus violates the First Amend-
54 Supra at 232-233. 
55380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
56 Supra note 49. 
s7The Court thus noted that: 
First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression 
must rest on the censor .... Second ... only a proceeding requiring a 
judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint .... To this 
end, the exliibitor must be assured, by statute or authoritative judicial 
construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period, either 
issue a license or go to court to restrain showing of the rum. 380 U.S. at 
58-59. 
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ment's ban on prior restraints both substantively and proce-
durally. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the Commission could 
draft any rule which would meet the Court's restrictions. 
Discrimination 
The Supreme Court consistently has held under both the 
. First and Fourteenth Amendments that a government may not 
discriminate in granting fIrst amendment rights.5 II The rule 
discriminates quite overtly, however, by allowing only selected 
Commission personnel to publish. Thus a Commissioner or 
administrative law judge is perfectly free to publish, while a 
staff employee is totally barred. As noted before,5 9 there are 
perfectly valid legal reasons for exempting these two groups 
from the rule. In practical terms, however, a Commissioner or a 
judge carries much more weight with the public and thus has a 
much greater ability to bring about the very evils at which the 
rule appears to be directed.60 
Accordingly, the Commission has chosen the wrong way of 
remedying its legal inability to prohibit publication by Commis-
sioners and judges. Instead of promulgating a discriminatory 
rule, it simply should have adopted no rule at all. 
Private Law Analogy 
Although labor unions generally are not subject to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, both state courts and Congress61 have 
imposed limitations on unions' power to expel members for 
criticizing either offIcials or policy. The cases in this area often 
involved conduct which went beyond the boundaries of criti-
cism; the courts frequently were reviewing a bitter internal 
58 See, e.g., Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) and Public 
Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904), where the Court held that 
the Post Office could not deny mailing privileges to disapproved literature. 
59 Supra note 11. As indicated there, both Commissioners and judges 
have statutory independence from the Commission's rules. 
60Por an analysis of the supposed evils, see pp. 234-237, supra. 
61 29 U.S.C. § 4il(a)(2) (1972). 
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power struggle-a situation not likely to arise from Commission 
employee's publishing an article. 
The courts have justified their intervention in this area on a 
number of bases. Very often they have invalidated explusions 
from unions under the guise of a failure of procedural due 
process or through an overly narrow construction of the union's 
constitution.62 A few courts have invoked the free speech 
guarantees of their state constitutions,63 and one based its 
decision on the federal Constitution without explaining how 
state action was present.64 A New York and a California court 
came to exactly the same conclusion, however, merely on the 
grounds of public policy. 65 
The case for government employees should be even more 
compelling that that for union members. On the one hand, 
explusion from a union does not constitute deprivation of a 
livelihood; indeed, a member may well not lose his or her job, 
unless he or she works in a closed shop.6 6 On the other hand, a 
union needs discipline more than a government agency; the 
union must present a unified front in a bargaining situ'ation, 
while an agency requires only enough unity to preserve effi-
ciency. Accordingly, it is somewhat ironic that Commission 
employees receive more limited fIrst amendment rights than 
union members. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's anti-publication rule thus represents an 
attempt to reach rather questionable ends through even more 
62Summers, Legal Limitation on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 
1049 (1951); Summers, The Law of Union Discipline, 70 Yale L. J. 175, 
193-94 (1960). 
63 Harrison v. Brotherhood of Railway and SS. Clerks, 271 S.W. 2d 852 
(Ct. App. Ky., 1954); Spayd v. Running Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67,112 A. 
70 (1921). 
64 Crossen v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252,103 N.E. 2d 769 (1951). 
65 Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y. 2d 283,174 N.Y.S. 2d 653, 151 N.E.2d 
73 (1958); Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 
(Dist Ct. App. 1961). 
66 Summers, The Law of Union Discipline, 70 Yale L. J. 175, 179 
(1960). 
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questionable means; as noted before,67 it is almost impossible 
to ascertain the purpose of the rule, let alone its meaning. 
Moreover, the rule infringes on Commission employees' fIrst 
amendment rights to a degree which a court probably would 
not tolerate. 
Accordingly, the Commission simply should repeal the 
clearance requirement of the rule. To be sure, a total lack of 
any procedure might redound to Commission employees' detri-
ment, by encouraging their superiors to exercise covert "lifted 
eyebrow" regulation. This type of suppression is just as possible 
under the existing rule, however, and few Commission em-
ployees are intellectually dishonest enough to suppress their 
inferiors' dissident viewpoints. 
In the past, the Commission has gone to great lengths to 
protect the first amendment rights of its licensees and the 
public. It now should do the same for its own personnel. 
67 Supra at 234. 
